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Argument
Appellant St. Mark’s Hospital respectfully submits this reply brief in
support of its appeal in this consolidated case. As explained in its opening brief,
these cases—and the thousand-plus essentially identical medical malpractice cases
that are expected to follow—are all time-barred on their face, and the Appellees
(the “Patients”) have failed to plead sufficient facts to overcome the time bar.
In their response brief, the Patients attempt to lower their burden
considerably, proposing a pleading standard that is essentially no standard at all.
The Court should reverse the decisions of the district courts below, insofar as they
rejected application of the four-year statute of repose to bar these claims, and
should hold that the Patients have not met the well-established pleading standard
to overcome the time bar in their facially stale cases.
This ruling will provide significant guidance in these three cases and the
thousand-plus cases that are anticipated to follow. This Court’s reversal of the
district courts’ rulings in these three cases will reaffirm the importance and
strength of the statute of repose bar as a vital legal protection to the diligent and
dedicated health care providers in Utah who deserve repose from potential claims
that have long gone stale, particularly when the plaintiff can make no specific
allegations that would support removing the time bar. Such a ruling would also

1

best comport with the plain language of the medical malpractice statute of repose
and the Utah Legislature’s intent in enacting that statute.
Further, to the extent the other appellants in this case advance additional or
supplementary arguments that support St. Mark’s claims for relief, St. Mark’s
adopts those arguments as though stated herein.
I.

The Patients’ proposed pleading standard would effectively nullify the
statute of repose.
In their opposition brief, the Patients appropriately recognize that they have

a statutory obligation to allege certain facts in their operative Complaint(s) to
enable this otherwise facially time-barred litigation to proceed.1 The only issue
remaining is what facts plaintiffs must allege when their claims are facially barred
by the statute of repose. This is a critical question that bears directly on whether
the healthcare malpractice statute of repose will have effectiveness in Utah going
forward.
One way to approach the question of “what facts” must be pleaded is to ask:
what pleading standard would be meaningful? What pleading standard would
protect health care providers from being confronted with stale claims, as intended
by the legislature, while also allowing diligent plaintiffs who were legitimately
and fraudulently prevented by those providers from discovering their claims to

Br. of Appellees at 2 (stating “[a]s to the fraudulent concealment exception, the statute describes
what allegations are necessary”); see generally id. at 29-35.
1

2

bring their claims? The Patients’ proposed standard does not strike that
balance. Their proposed standard would establish, in essence, that so long as a
plaintiff recites “magic words”, they are entitled to discovery. So long as they
merely utter or write the words “affirmative acts” and “fraudulent concealment”,
they’ve done enough. But that is no meaningful standard at all, and it is not
consistent with Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 9(c) and supporting case law, which
require that fraud be pleaded with particularity in “all circumstances where the
pleader alleges the kind of misrepresentations, omissions, or other deceptions
covered by the term ‘fraud’ in its broadest dimension.” Williams v. State Farm Ins.
Co., 656 P.2d 966, 967 (Utah 1982); Shah v. Intermountain Healthcare, Inc., 2013 UT
App. 261 at ¶¶10, 12 (in pleading fraud, a plaintiff must identify the “who, what,
when, where and how” of the fraud).
The pleading standard of rule 9(c) is specifically designed to “deter filing
exploratory suits with little information in the hopes that discovery will uncover
information to support the allegations.” Id. (citing Republic Bank & Trust Co. v. Bear
Stearns & Co., 683 F.3d 239, 255 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Rule 9[c] [of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure] is designed, not only to put defendants on notice of alleged
misconduct, but also to prevent fishing expeditions . . . .”); Cornejo v. JPMorgan
Chase Bank, No. CV 11-4119 CAS(VBKx), 2012 WL 628179, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 27,
2012) (“Plaintiffs’ assertion that they will ‘not know until discovery’ the specific
3

misrepresentations made is precisely what Rule 9[c] [of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure] seeks to prevent.”)).
In addition to being completely inconsistent with rule 9(c), a magic words
test does not protect any health care provider from defending stale claims, any
more than would a pleading standard that does not require the plaintiff to allege
anything at all. The standard proposed by the Patients does nothing but create a
roadmap to rendering the statute of repose meaningless in every case.
But suppose the Patients are right that magic words and vague, conclusory
allegations that simply track the bare language of the statute are all that is
required. Even then, the Patients haven’t alleged—in any sensible fashion—that
they were “prevented from discovering misconduct” because St. Mark’s
“affirmatively acted to fraudulently conceal the alleged misconduct.” Utah Code
Ann. §78B-3-404(2)(b). The statute requires that allegation, and the Patients’
Complaints create no connection or link between the alleged “affirmative acts” of
“fraudulent concealment” and the “prevention of discovery” because they do not
allege that any of these patients did anything to discover or investigate their injury
or had any interaction with anyone at St. Mark’s subsequent to their septal defect
closure procedures.
When convenient, the Patients claim they had no way to know their
procedure was unnecessary before they saw lawyer advertising. But they also
4

allege in their Amended Complaints that it was well known that no one performed
as many PFO procedures as Dr. Sorensen, and that the standard for PFO closure
was well-established. (Br. of Appellees at 2-10.) If that were truly the case, it would
not have been difficult for the Patients to investigate their claims if they had
wanted to. Simply put, the Patients cannot allege “prevention of discovery” and
therefore their claims fail.
Although the Patients claim that all they need to do is allege the magic
words to be entitled to discovery, they also say they have gone beyond that
minimum requirement by alleging “specific” affirmative acts of fraudulent
concealment. That is, they claim in their brief that they allege that Dr. Sorensen
and St. Mark’s “falsified records” and doctored charts, and then concealed that
conduct from the plaintiffs.2 (Br. of Appellees at 8-12, 30-35.) But because there are
no allegations that St. Mark’s ever interacted with the Patients regarding their
procedures, the generalized and vague allegation that St. Mark’s (somehow)
doctored records of some patients is not an affirmative act that would prevent the

In fact, the complaints really only make a broad, conclusory allegation that “Sorensen and St.
Mark’s created false statements and documents to conceal the fact that Sorensen was performing
medically unnecessary closures”, but then specify nothing as to St. Mark’s. Instead, the complaints
state only that “[f]or instance, Sorensen often created medical charts that falsely reflected that the
patients had suffered from, or were at risk of suffering from, recurrent cryptogenic stroke in order
to get insurance to pay for the procedure” and that the “effort to disguise the true diagnosis and
reason for the closures shows that Sorensen was always aware of and understood the true
standard of care for these procedures.” (Bright R. 86, Merlo-Schmucker R. 100 (emphasis added).)
But in spite of this lack of specificity in the pleadings, their brief on appeal frames these allegations
as being fully directed towards both Dr. Sorenson and St. Mark’s.
2
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plaintiff from discovering the injury.3 Utah Code Ann. §78B-3-404(2)(c). And, of
course, none of these alleged “affirmative acts” or “fraudulent acts” of fraudulent
concealment are stated with particularity, because they do not allege the required
“who, what, when, where, and how” of the alleged fraudulent concealment. There
are no allegations as to who at St. Mark’s doctored any charts or records, which
patients’ records were doctored (let alone alleging that these patients’ records were
doctored), or when, where, or how that occurred.
The Patients seek to take a narrow exception to the statute of repose and
dramatically expand it, such that the statue of repose would be essentially
rendered meaningless. The Patients, of course, must take this position because
their cases are plainly time-barred, and a logical application of the statute of repose
and its narrow exceptions does not help them at all. A logical application of the
exception found in section 78B-3-404(2)(c) indicates that the exception would
apply only in a situation where the defendant did something directly to the plaintiff
that prevented her from discovering the alleged malpractice. That is, if the
Patients, within four years of their surgical procedures, went to an administrator
at St. Mark’s and said “I read these PFO closures are rarely performed, and only
when there are multiple strokes. I didn’t have multiple strokes. What’s going

There are no facts alleged that would support the allegation that St. Mark’s doctored the specific
Patients’ records that would be at issue in this case.
3
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on?” And then the hospital administrator said “oh, you did actually have multiple
strokes” or “that data is all wrong and your surgery was fine.”4 The Patients did
not—and never could—allege anything of the sort, and thus their claims cannot
seek a common-sense or appropriate application of the exception.
While vaguely alleging record falsification, the Patients repeatedly claim
that any evidence of fraudulent concealment is exclusively in St. Mark’s
possession, and therefore they cannot meet a heightened pleading standard and
are entitled to conduct discovery. (Br. of Appellees at 51.) Again, this argument
suffers from a logical deficit that shows how far removed it is from the commonsense application of the exception. If there had been any affirmative act of
fraudulent concealment by anyone with St. Mark’s that prevented the Patients
from discovering their alleged injuries, the Patients themselves would know about
it because they would have had the memorable experience of interacting with
someone at St. Mark’s regarding their procedure, and they could allege that.
The Patients’ argument that “silence” is somehow equivalent to affirmative
fraudulent concealment in this context is yet a further effort to greatly weaken the
statute of repose. (Br. of Appellees at 30-35.) Specifically, the Patients argue that
the defendants “decided to modify the medical charts and conceal from rather

Of course, because St. Mark’s merely provided a cath lab as the location for the surgeries, and
the physician defendant was not an agent or employee of St. Mark’s, no administrator or other
staff of St. Mark’s would be able to respond to any such inquiries.
4
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than inform any of the patients who had received [a PFO or ASD closure surgery].”
(Br. of Appellees at 31.) In making this argument, the Patients rely on Jensen I for
the proposition that “silence under the circumstances” can “amount to an
affirmation that a state of things exists which does not exist.” (Id. at 32 (quoting
Jensen v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 944 P.2d 327 (Utah 1997) (“Jensen I”)).
But the actions that constituted affirmative fraudulent concealment in
Jensen I are entirely distinguishable from the lack of action alleged in these cases.5
In Jensen I, the patient, Shelly Hipwell, had been treated by a Dr. Healy. After
Hipwell suffered a complication and was in a coma, Dr. Healy talked to his
brother, attorney Healy, and encouraged attorney Healy to have the Healys’ sister,
DeVries, contact Shelly’s family to suggest that they retain attorney Sharp. Jensen
I, 944 P.2d at 329. DeVries was also Dr. Healy’s file clerk. Id.
Shelley’s family then retained attorney Sharp, as suggested by attorney
Healy. Id. Attorney Healy and attorney Sharp had correspondence that “ma[de]
clear that attorney Healy was communicating with Dr. Healy about attorney
Sharp’s investigation and impl[ied] that attorney Sharp’s investigation of Dr.
Healy’s treatment was to be minimal.” Id. Moreover, when attorney Sharp asked
Dr. Healy for all of Shelly’s medical records, “Dr. Healy did not produce a copy of

The Patients’ reliance on Jensen I is also misplaced because in that case, the statute of repose had
not expired.
5
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all medical records, but instead produced a selective set of documents that he
personally reviewed.” Id.
Years later, when Shelly’s family brought suit, the various defendants—
including Dr. Healy—moved for summary judgment, arguing that the suit was
barred by the statute of limitations. Id. at 333. In response, Shelly’s family argued
that the fraudulent concealment exception operated to save their claim from
dismissal. Id. Under those facts, this Court concluded that there was a genuine
dispute of material fact as to whether “Dr. Healy’s fraudulent concealment
somehow prevented Shelley’s family” from timely filing suit, and therefore the
trial court’s grant of summary judgment was reversed and remanded. Id. at 335.
In the setting of those facts, this Court conducted an “in-depth discussion of
the complex law of fraudulent concealment.” Id. at 333. It was in that discussion
that this Court observed that remaining silent or otherwise acting to conceal
material facts may sometimes amount to fraudulent concealment, but “[t]he
party’s silence must amount to fraud, i.e., silence under the circumstances must
amount to an affirmation that a state of things exists which does not exist, and the
uninformed party must be deprived to the same extent as if a positive assertion
had been made.” Id. (citing 37 Am.Jur.2d Fraud & Deceit § 145 (1968)).
In Jensen I, though, Dr. Healy took multiple affirmative actions to divert
attention away from his care and to deceive Shelly’s family: he contacted his
9

brother, attorney Healy, to orchestrate the family’s retention of a friendly attorney
who would steer the focus away from Dr. Healy’s care. He engaged in continuing
communications with attorney Healy about the suit. He responded only
selectively to attorney Sharp’s request for all of Shelly’s records, personally
reviewing her entire chart to select which records would be produced. Although
Dr. Healy may not have directly communicated to Shelley’s family some
misrepresentation that would lull them into inaction, the steps he took were
nonetheless affirmative actions that may have caused the family to delay filing suit
against Dr. Healy.
In contrast, here the Patients’ only allegations against St. Mark’s are truly in
the nature of inaction or omission.6 The Patients argue that St. Mark’s had “actual
knowledge” of the supposedly clear standard for performing PFO closures and
that Dr. Sorensen’s surgeries violated that clear standard, and then the hospital
had to “decide whether to disclose it”—this was the “affirmative act” by St. Mark’s.
(Br. of Appellees at 32.) The hospital’s thought process or decision-making
process—followed by no affirmative steps—simply cannot be an affirmative
action. See Chapman v. Primary Children’s Hosp., 784 P.2d 1181, 1186 (Utah 1989).

The Merlo-Schmucker court appropriately recognized that “[i]t is not clear from the Amended
Complaint whether any Defendant acted affirmatively within the meaning of the statute to
fraudulently conceal anything.” (Merlo R. 402.) That court also commented that “Defendants’
argument that inaction or omission by a defendant is not sufficient to overcome the time bar
appears to be well taken.” (Id.)
6
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It is undisputed that because the Patients’ claims arise from health care
provided to them by the appellants, the claims are subject to the four-year statute
of repose found in section 78B-3-404. The parties (and the district courts) all further
acknowledge that Patients’ claims arose more than four years before suit was filed;
that section 78B-3-404 applies to the Patients’ claims; and that to avoid being timebarred, the delay in bringing their claims must have been due to St. Mark’s
affirmative fraudulent concealment of their claims.
But as the repose statute makes clear, the Patients’ claims can be saved from
the statute of repose only if their complaints include allegations of affirmative,
fraudulent concealment that prevented discovery of the malpractice. Utah Rule of
Civil Procedure 9 and a long-settled body of dispositive case law make clear that
“in alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.” (Utah R. Civ. P. 9(c) (emphasis
added).) In this case, the Patients’ attempts to plead around the statute of repose
did not contain the “who, what, when, where, and how” of the alleged fraudulent
concealment by St. Mark’s. In fact, even after amending their complaints, the
Patients made no allegations of affirmative fraudulent concealment by St. Mark’s,
let alone particularized allegations. Accordingly, the district courts erred in failing
to dismiss the Patients’ complaints in their entirety because absent allegations of
particularized facts establishing St. Mark’s affirmative fraudulent concealment,
11

their complaints failed to satisfy rule 9(c) and were barred by section 78B-3404(2)(b).
The Patients’ proposed pleading standard would eliminate any teeth to the
statute of repose; as the Bright court noted at oral argument, the Patients’ argument
“turn[s] the statute of repose on its head”, and if the “failure to speak can be the
affirmative act to fraudulently conceal . . . when would you ever have a claim
barred under the statute of repose?” (Bright R. 688-89.) In the Patients’ view, vague
and non-specific allegations of record falsification not tied to a specific patient in
this case—or a specific defendant—plus silence to the patient population at large
somehow equals “affirmative fraudulent concealment” sufficient to prevent a
specific patient, who has demonstrated no interest in discovering a cause of action,
from discovering that claim. Again, this is trying to create a roadmap to beating
the statute of repose in every case, and would effectively eliminate the statute of
repose altogether.
II.

The Foreign Object Exception Does Not Apply to This Case.
The Patients’ brief devotes considerable energy to arguing that the district

court’s order can be affirmed under the “foreign object” exception to the statute of
repose found in Utah Code Ann. §78B-3-404(2)(a) because, in their view, that
exception applies whenever “a foreign object is wrongfully left in a patient’s
body,” regardless of whether the patient was aware of its existence at the time of
12

the underlying procedure.7 (Br. of Appellees at 52.) The Tapp court8 sensibly
recognized that the foreign object “exception does not apply on its face” because
“the ‘device’ that was placed into [the Patients] was the precise device that was
contemplated for the surgery[.] . . . It would be non-sensical to apply this statute
to medical devices that were the very object of a patient’s surgery.” (Tapp R. 750
(emphasis in original).)
Specifically, the Patients focus on the term “wrongfully” to suggest that
Utah’s repose statute is more broadly written than those of many states that have
rejected this argument, and that the legislature’s use of “wrongfully” changes the
outcome because that word “encompasses both negligent and intentional
wrongdoing.” (Br. of Appellees at 56.) This interpretation should be rejected
because it improperly seeks to define the legislature’s intent solely through the
term “wrongfully” while ignoring or rendering inoperative the remaining parts
and words in the statute.
It is well-established that when interpreting statutory language, this Court’s
“primary task is to give effect to the intent of the legislature.” Turner v. Staker &
Parson Companies, 2012 UT 30, ¶12, 284 P.3d 600, 603. To do so, this Court will “look

7The

Patients did not plead this exception in their complaints or their amended complaints, nor
did they raise this in opposition to their motions to dismiss. See Merlo-Schmucker R. 243-283 and
Bright R. 255-281 (plaintiffs’ briefs in opposition to motions to dismiss amended complaints).
8 The Bright and Merlo-Schmucker courts did not address the Patients’ “foreign object” arguments
in their written rulings, perhaps because the exception so obviously did not apply.
13

first to the plain language of the statute and ‘presume that the legislature used
each word advisedly and read each term according to its ordinary and accepted
meaning.’” Id. Furthermore, “[w]herever possible, [this Court] [will] give effect to
every word of a statute,” and will “avoid[]‘[a]ny interpretation which renders
parts or words in a statute inoperative or superfluous.’” Id. And when the Court
can “ascertain the intent of the legislature from the statutory terms alone, ‘no other
interpretive tools are needed,’ and [the] task of statutory construction is typically
at an end.” Bagley v. Bagley, 2016 UT 48, ¶10, 387 P.3d 1000, 1005.
The foreign object exception to section 78B-3-404(2)(a) states in pertinent
part:
(a)
“In an action where the allegation against the
health care provider is that a foreign object has been
wrongfully left within the patient’s body, the claim shall
be barred unless commenced within one year after the
plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use of
reasonable diligence should have discovered, the
existence of the foreign object wrongfully left in the patient’s
body, whichever first occurs.”

Id. (emphasis added). By its plain language, the only reasonable interpretation of
the statute is that it is meant to apply to those narrow sets of claims where a patient
subsequently discovers, years later, “the existence” of an unanticipated,
unplanned “foreign object” that was never intended to be left in the patient’s body
at the conclusion of their prior medical care or surgical procedure.
14

This interpretation is consistent with previous decisions of this Court over
the course of the past half century. In Christiansen v. Rees, 436 P.2d 435 (Utah 1968),
this Court described the types of facts that would give rise to the application of the
foreign object exception to an otherwise time-barred claim, noting both the
physician’s “negligence” in leaving a broken surgical needle in the patient’s body
and the patient’s “ignorance” of that fact following the conclusion of the surgery.
Specifically, and consistent with the plain language of the exception when read as
a whole, this Court held that
“where a foreign object is negligently left in the body of a
patient during an operation and the patient is ignorant of the
fact, and consequently of his right of action for
malpractice, the cause of action does not accrue until the
patient learned of the presence of such foreign object in his
body.”
Id. (emphasis added); see also Day v. Meek, 1999 UT 28, ¶21, 976 P.2d 1202, 1208
(describing claims eligible for application of the foreign object exception as those
where healthcare providers “negligently leave [a] foreign object inside patients”
whose presence was “not discovered for extended periods of time”). Thus, as these
cases demonstrate, it is clear that the legislature intentionally sought to limit this
exception to only those claims involving unknown objects negligently left and
subsequently discovered in the patient’s body rather than to claims, like those
asserted here, where a plaintiff who underwent a procedure that she knew

15

involved the insertion of a foreign object later asserts that that procedure should
never have been performed in the first place.
Nonetheless, in an effort to shoehorn their claims into this exception, the
Patients argue that the use of the term “wrongfully” indicates that the Utah
Legislature intended the exception to apply whenever a foreign object was left in a
patient’s body, regardless of whether it was intentionally or unintentionally left
there by the defendant healthcare provider, and regardless of whether the patient
knew at the time of the procedure that it would be permanently implanted. (Br. of
Appellees at 52, 54-57.) But this interpretation necessarily ignores the legislature’s
use of plain and specific terms relating to the patient’s “discovery” of “the
existence of the foreign object” that was “wrongfully left” in the patient’s body.
Utah Code Ann. §78B-3-404(2)(a).
In support of their position, Patients principally rely on cases from other
jurisdictions interpreting those states’ repose statutes and foreign object
exceptions. But these cases either support St. Mark’s position or are readily
distinguishable. For example, in Hershley v. Brown, 655 S.W.2d 671, 675 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1983), the Missouri Court of Appeals explicitly recognized the critical
distinction—for purposes of applying the foreign object exception—between
claims arising from a unknown foreign object negligently left within a patient’s
body, and claims arising from allegations where a known “foreign object” was
16

intentionally left behind during an underlying procedure that was alleged to have
been negligently performed. The Hershley court explained, consistent with prior
holdings of this Court, that
“[t]o fall within this [foreign object] tolling provision, the
petition must allege that the object was introduced and
negligently permitted to remain in the body. This
situation is distinguished from one in which the foreign object
is intentionally introduced in the body and is intended to
remain there, although the procedure itself is performed
in a negligent manner. Negligence of the latter type does
not fall within the [foreign object] tolling provision of §
516.105.”
Id. (emphasis added).
The other cases cited in the Patients’ brief are similarly distinguishable. In
Norred v. Teaver, 740 S.E.2d 251 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013), unlike the case at bar, the
foreign object exception applied because the patient did not discover that her
physician had negligently left a cotton pellet in her body after performing a root
canal, until she developed a subsequent infection requiring additional surgery. Id.
at 251-52. In contrast to the cases before this Court, in Norred the plaintiff did not
allege that the cotton pellet was intended to remain in the tooth socket after a
permanent crown was placed. Id. at 509. Instead, in that case the cotton pellet was
more like the broken surgical needle in Christiansen or the retained surgical sponge
in Day.

17

Similarly, Beatman v. Gates, 521 N.E.2d 521 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987), is
distinguishable. Beatman involved a claim where the intentionally-implanted IUD
had subsequently been found to have been dislodged from what was believed to
be its original location. The court found that the foreign object exception applied
because the device was no longer serving its intended purpose and no longer
belonged in the patient’s body. Id. at 523.
In Chambers v. Semmer, 197 S.W.3d 730, 734-35 (Tenn. 2006), the Tennessee
Supreme Court explicitly distinguished its case, involving a hemoclip negligently
left within the patient’s body without her knowledge, from claims such as this one,
where the patient knew about the foreign object intentionally placed within her
body. Id. at 734 (citing Hall v. Ervin, 642 S.W.2d 724 (Tenn. 1982), wherein the same
court found that the foreign object exception did not apply to claims arising out of
placement of IUD because the patient knew about the device, it was not
inadvertently inserted, and the defendants’ negligence was instead based on the
way the procedure was performed)).
Thus, if any case from Tennessee is instructive here, it is Hall because at its
core, Patients’ claims are not that the PFO closure devices were allowed to remain
within their bodies when they should have been removed prior to the completion
of the surgery, but rather that the procedures themselves—the underlying closure
surgeries—should never have been performed at all.
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Ultimately, this Court need look no further than the plain language of
Utah’s foreign object exception to find that it was clearly intended to be applied
only to those narrow sets of cases where a patient subsequently discovers the
existence of an unanticipated, unplanned foreign object that was never intended
to be left in the patient’s body at the conclusion of a prior surgical procedure. The
exception was never intended to apply to the alleged discovery that it was
wrongful that the device was left. These Patients all obviously knew that the
device was left in them; that was the exact point of the procedure, to fix the septal
defect with a closure device. The Patients’ interpretation would eliminate the
statue of repose any time anything was placed in someone for medical benefit,
such as stents in arteries, metal plates, artificial hip joints, and the like, because
the plaintiff could simply allege it was “wrongfully” done and avoid the clear
repose bar.
The foreign object argument is yet another example of the Patients—faced
with an obviously time-barred case—attempting to dramatically expand a statute
of repose exception, in order to allow a thousand-plus additional medical
malpractice cases to proceed into discovery, at enormous cost to the parties in this
case and with grave consequences to medical providers in Utah. Just as the Tapp
court did, this Court should find that section 78B-3-404(2)(b) does not apply to this
case.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons argued in all three appellants' briefs, the arguments of which
St. Mark's adopts by reference, St. Mark's respectfully asks this Court to reverse
the district courts' application of rules 12(b)(6) and 9(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. The Patients' claims are untimely under section 78B-3-404 and all
remaining claims against St. Mark's should be dismissed with prejudice.
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